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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:i

v.

1

Case No- 970275-CA

JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD,

s

Priority No. 2

Defendants/Appellees.

s

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals an order of the district court dismissing
an information charging one count of abuse or desecration of a
dead human body, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-704 (1995).

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1995) and 782a-3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVTEW
After finding probable cause to believe that defendants
disinterred human remains from an Anasazi archaeological site,
did the preliminary hearing court err by refusing to bind
defendants over on charges of abuse or desecration of a dead

1

human body, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704?
The court's interpretation of a statute presents a question
of law, reviewed for correctness.

State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d

1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1995) is found in addendum A.
The two earlier versions of the same statute are cited in the
body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged in separate informations with one
count each of abuse or desecration of a dead human body, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1), and
one count each of trespassing on school trust lands, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-301(l)(f)
(Supp. 1994) (R. 1-2)-1

Following a preliminary hearing, the

court refused to bind over, dismissed the felony charge against
each defendant, and stayed the misdemeanor proceedings (R. 48-50
or addendum B).

The State then timely appealed the dismissal of

1

Record citations are to State v. James Redd, district
court case no. 9617-229. Many of the same documents also appear
in the record for the companion case, State v. Jeanne Redd,
district court case no. .9617-230. This Court granted the state's
motion to consolidate the two cases for purposes of appeal.
2

the felony charges (R. 59-60) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of January 6, 1996, Ben Naranjo of the San
Juan County Sheriff's Office was contacted by dispatch and told
that Mike Pehrson, a resident of Bluff, wanted to talk to him "as
soon as possible'' (R. 69). Naranjo immediately went to Pehrson's
home, where Pehrson informed him that he and his stepson, while
hiking, had observed several people digging in an area known to
contain Anasazi ruins (R. 70). Pehrson said he had observed
similar activity in the same area on several previous occasions
as well.

Erv Guymon, who was present when Naranjo arrived and

who owned property in the area Pehrson described, told Naranjo
that "if it was on his property, nobody had permission at that
time to be on there" (R. 70).
Naranjo, with Pehrson accompanying him, then drove to the
dig site, located about five miles outside of Bluff, up a dirt
road in South Cottonwood Canyon (R. 70, 82). 2 As they approached
the site, they observed a pickup truck with vanity license plates
reading *ANASAZI."

Three children were standing near the vehicle

2

According to Naranjo, Cottonwood Canyon was generally
known around Bluff as Guymon's property. The canyon was accessed
by a single, gated road (R. 78). Pehrson lived just below the
gate (R. 79).
3

(R. 71). Naranjo asked the children if there was any digging
going on, and they responded that there was, but that they were
on Erv Guymon's property with his permission (R. 71).
Defendants then came running down from the dig site, which
was located up a little hill, out of sight, and asked Naranjo why
he was there and what he was doing (R. 71). When Naranjo
explained that someone had observed them digging, defendants
asked for details, claiming that Erv Guymon had given them
permission some three weeks earlier to be on the property (R.
72).

During this conversation, Phil Hall, who ran what defendant

James Redd described to Naranjo as "that liberal democratic
newspaper down in Bluff," drove up.

Agitated by Hall's presence,

defendant said to Naranjo, "Get him out of here.

I don't want to

speak with him" (R. 73). At this juncture, Naranjo decided to
"just back off and go talk to Mr. Guymon and ask him about
permission to be on his property" (Id.).3
Later investigation established that the dig site was on
state land (R. 97). An archaeologist from the Bureau of Land

3

Despite his earlier disclaimer (R. 70), Erv Guymon later
told Naranjo that he remembered giving defendants permission to
be on the land, but not to dig. In any event, Guymon said that
he and James Redd were friends, and that he would take care of
the matter (R. 74).
4

Management described the site and the indications of digging that
he observed three days after the confrontation with defendants:
The site itself consisted of a building that
was about 30 feet across and sort of a northto- south access with a courtyard in front and
a kiva to the south, and east of that, a
midden area and there was a large rectangular
hole that had been -- been dug into that
midden, and the resulting back dirt from that
excavation was piled in the immediate
vicinity of the --of the hole.
(R. 100). The archaeologist opined that the digging was very
recent.4

He found 13-15 bones, "generally within very close

proximity to those areas of. . . dirt that had been recently
screened, as if they had been on screen there [sic] and sort of
tossed out'' (R. 103) . The archaeologist stated, *I felt very
strongly that they were human remains" (Id.).
Based on these facts, defendants were charged with abuse or
desecration of a dead human body, a third degree felony, and
trespass on trust lands, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). After
hearing the preliminary hearing evidence, the court found

4

This opinion was based on the archaeologist's observation
that on the back dirt piles . . . where the screens had been
laid that were. . . used to process the dirt [J. . . [y]ou could
still see the impressions of . . . the screens on the dirt and .
• . because . . . no rain had taken place, the dirt was very soft
. . .[and] that kind of. information would have blown away very
quickly" (R. 101).
w

5

probable cause to believe both that defendants had trespassed on
school trust lands and that they had disturbed or disinterred
human remains (R. 109 or addendum C).

Nonetheless, the court

refused to bind over on the felony charge, citing in both its
oral and written orders a single reason for its decision.

With

no dispositive facts in dispute, the court dismissed the felony
charge only because it thought that human remains were not
intended to fall within the ambit of the controlling statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (R. 49 or addendum A; R. 109-11 or
addendum C).

Anticipating an appeal, the court held the trespass

charge in abeyance for six months, for a status conference as to
the felony charge (R. 49).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The preliminary hearing court found probable cause to
believe that defendants had disinterred human remains from a
known Anasazi archaeological site.

However, the court then made

an error of statutory interpretation, incorrectly determining
that Anasazi bones do not fall within the ambit of section 76-9704, governing abuse or desecration of a dead human body.

Since

the court openly acknowledged the ambiguity inherent in section
76-9-704, this Court should appropriately look to the legislative
history and purpose of the statute to determine its fair meaning.
6

The policy underlying the law is two-fold: to secure "unbroken
final repose" for the dead and to prevent desecration of the dead
for pecuniary gain.

Interpreting Mead human body" in light of

these purposes leads to the conclusion that as long as the
disinterring is done intentionally and unlawfully, the condition
of the disinterred dead should not be dispositive.

Indeed, where

the evidence showed that defendants were intentionally and
unlawfully digging in a known Anasazi burial site and where they
disinterred human bones, their acts fell well within the historic
purposes of section 76-9-704.
Furthermore, the preliminary hearing court's ruling renders
section 76-9-704 internally inconsistent and at odds with other
relevant statutes.

First, if subsection (1), defining the

unlawful conduct, involves only Mead human bodies," then the
exception for the Antiquities Act in subsection (2) becomes
irrelevant, because the Antiquities Act addresses conduct
involving "remains," which the preliminary hearing court saw as a
category entirely separate from "dead human bodies."

And second,

a related statute, the Native American Grave Protection Act
("NAGPRA"), defines "remains" as "all or part of a physical
individual."

Because NAGPRA and section 76-9-704 have common

purposes, they should be interpreted harmoniously.
7

Finally, public policy dictates that all human remains be
treated with respect, regardless of whether they are interred in
ways customary to the dominant culture or in ways little
understood by some modern peoples.

The act to be criminalized is

a knowing and intentional disinterment.

The particular condition

of the remains should be irrelevant.

ARGUMENT
PQINT ONE
THE TERM "DEAD HUMAN BODY" AS USED
IN SECTION 76-9-704, WHEN VIEWED IN
LIGHT OF THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF
THE STATUTE, PROPERLY INCLUDES THE
ANASAZI BONES THAT DEFENDANTS
DISINTERRED FROM A KNOWN ANASAZI
BURIAL SITE
Defendants were charged with one count each of desecration
of a dead human body, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9704 (1), which provides:
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body if the
person intentionally and unlawfully:
(a) removes, conceals, fails to
report the finding of a dead body
to a local law enforcement agency,
or destroys a dead body or any part
of it;
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise
interred dead body, without
authority of a court order;
8

(c) dismembers a dead body to any
extent, or damages or detaches any
part or portion of a dead body; or
(d) commits, or attempts to commit
upon any dead body sexual
penetration. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1) (1995).
Although the preliminary hearing court found probable cause
to believe that defendants disinterred human remains, it
nonetheless dismissed the third degree felony charges against
them because it believed that the statute under which they had
been charged, which used the term M e a d human body," did not
include the prehistoric bones that defendants unearthed from an
identified archaeological site

(R. 110-11 or addendum C ) .

The court, in orally articulating the thought process
underlying its ultimate ruling, outlined the ambiguity inherent
in interpreting whether the term M e a d human body" as used in
section 76-9-704 included prehistoric bones.

The court first

stated:
[T]here's one school of thought that it
doesn't matter how old the remains are,
they're still human remains, and they need to
be protected from being disturbed. . . .
[T]hese people probably have descendants
living today who care that they be treated
with respect. The descendants of these
people probably are the Pueblo Indians, if -if any descendants exist.

9

(R. 109-10 or addendum C).

The court then laid out an opposing

interpretation for Mead human body," as used in section 76-9704:
The other school of thought is . . . there's
a rule of reason that has to apply here,
we're talking about disturbing human remains
that have been buried in a place that's been
set aside for the preserving of human
remains, the cemetery, and -- and there has
to be a certain point when we can't . . .
hold people guilty for a . . . third degree
felony because they . . . don't avoid all of
these remains[, which] are scattered all over
this part of the country.
(R. 110 or addendum C).
Having recognized these two opposing interpretations, the
court then candidly acknowledged the ambiguity inherent in the
statute:

"And I don't know -- really I don't know the answer to

the question.

There's these two philosophies, both of them . . .

legitimate and entitled to respect" (R. 110 or addendum C). 5

5

The court also revealed an additional, pragmatic
underpinning for its ruling:
[I]f I dismiss the charges, fail to bind
over, then the state could take an appeal,
the Supreme Court can tell us what the law is
on this case, and . • . we won't be
disturbing the citizens of the county, we
won't be putting Dr. and Mrs. Redd to the
trauma of a trial without knowing that that's
what the law is, by an authoritative source.
And what I think about this isn't gonna
10

This Court has previously noted that Ms]tatutory language
is ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have more than
one meaning."
1164,

B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 934 P.2d

1166 (Utah App. 1997)(citation omitted).

Here, the court

was plainly troubled by the ambiguity inherent in the controlling
statute.

Under such circumstances, a reviewing court is

warranted in looking beyond a plain language interpretation.

See

World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 p.2d 253, 259
(Utah 1994)("Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain
language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and
relevant policy considerations"); State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400,
401-02 (Utah App. 1997)(expressing willingness to resort to
legislative history and purpose for guidance when plain language
of statute is unclear);

State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah

1992)(looking to other methods of statutory interpretation when
the language of a statute is ambiguous).

matter when the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court reviews this. . . . [T]hey will
give my decision no deference whatsoever.
(R. Ill or addendum C). Thus, although the court ultimately
dismissed the felony charges, it was sufficiently troubled by the
facial ambiguity of the statute that it further justified its
ruling with an acknowledgement that dismissal might be more
expedient for the county and for defendants.
11

1. The legislative history and purposes of section 76-9-704
mandate an interpretation that includes Anasazi bones within
the ambit of the law.
The ambiguity expressed by the preliminary hearing court in
this case is resolved by taking a broader approach to statutory
interpretation.

By so doing, the goals of statutory

interpretation are well served:
"'The primary rule of statutory
interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'"

Sullivan v, Secular Grain Co> of Utah/ 853
P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)(quoting Reeves v.
fifiULllfi, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)).
Although we generally rely on the plain
language rule of statutory construction, id.
at 879, we note that an equally important
rule of statutory construction is that a
statute should be construed as a whole, with
all of its provisions construed to be
harmonious with each other and with the
overall legislative objective of the statute
(citations omitted).
Nivnn v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).

The statute governing abuse or desecration of a dead human
body has its origins in two 1898 statutes, found in the chapter
governing cemeteries:
Disinterring dead bodies a felony.--Every
person who mutilates, disinters, or removes
from the place of sepulture, the dead body of
a human being without authority of law is
guilty of a felony. But the provisions of
this section do not apply to any person who

12

removes the dead body of a relative or friend
for reinterment, nor to any physician who
shall make a post-mortem examination with the
consent of relatives or friends of the
deceased.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1 (1969).

The next section provides in

pertinent part:
Selling or dissecting bodies a felony.--Every
person who removes any part of the dead body
of a human being from any grave or other
place where the same has been buried . . .
with intent to sell the same or to dissect it
without authority of law, or from malice or
wantonness, is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison not exceeding five years.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-2 (1969).
These statutes, read in conjunction, plainly criminalized
the acts of grave robbers. Any person who disinterred a dead
human being or removed even a part of a human body from a grave
in a cemetery was guilty of a felony, regardless of whether the
intent was pecuniary or merely wanton.
The policy underlying the law seems to be two-fold.

First,

the law sought to ensure that once buried, the dead would be left
at rest, both out of respect for the deceased and for their
descendants:
This idea is so deeply woven into our legal
and cultural fabric that it is commonplace to
hear it spoken of as a *right" of the dead
and a charge on the quick. Neither the
13

ecclesiastical, common, nor civil system of
jurisprudence permits exhumation for less
than what are considered weighty, and
sometimes compelling, reasons. Securing
"unbroken final repose" has been the object
of both civil and criminal legislation.
21 A.L.R. 2d 472, 476 (1952).

Second, the laws sought to

discourage desecration of the interred dead for pecuniary gain:
From time immemorial civilized nations have
sought to protect the graves of the dead and
prevent the illegal removal of dead bodies
for the purposes of sale, dissection, or from
mere wantonness. * Civilized countries have
always recognized and protected, as sacred,
the right to . . .an undisturbed repose of
the human body when buried.'
Davis v. State. 6 S.E.2d 736, 737 (Ga. App. 1939)(citation
omitted).
values.

Both of these rationales reflect widely-held societal

£££, e»g», 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 10 (1966); 22A Am.

Jur. 2d Dead Bodies § 70 (1988); 21 A.L.R.2d at 476-77.

Courts

in Utah have on several occasions underscored the importance of
maintaining the sanctity of the grave, barring a strong showing
that the interests of justice require disinterment.

See Covert

v. Kennecott Copper Corp.. 23 Utah 252, 254-55, 461 P.2d 466,
468-69 (Utah 1969)(noting the custom of mankind is to treat the
dead with

%%

utmost consideration ranging from a high degree of

respect to reverence1* and that a violation of respect due to the
dead offends ^generally accepted standards of decency")/ Silver
14

King Coalition Mines Co. v. Tndus. Comm'n. 115 Utah 336# 340-41,

204 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1949) (refusing to disturb the sanctity of
the grave and a body once suitably buried except under
circumstances of extreme exigency).
In 1973, the grave robbing statutes were removed from the
code chapter governing cemeteries-6

The 1898 disinterment

statutes evolved into section 76-9-704, recodified in chapter 9,
governing offenses against public order and decency:
Abuse of a corpse.--(1) A person is guilty of
abuse of a corpse if he intentionally and
unlawfully:
(a) Removes, conceals, dissects, or
destroys a corpse or any part thereof:
or
(b) Disinters a corpse that has been
buried or otherwise interred.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1973).
While the 1973 recodification changed the structure and
wording of the 1898 statutes, there is no indication that the
essential purposes underlying the law changed.

Indeed, the

removal of the statutes from the cemetery chapter fairly implies
that the legislature no longer intended them to be limited to
disinterments that occur within cemeteries.

6

As of 1973, then,

Chapter 8, the primary chapter devoted to cemeteries, now
focuses largely on the maintenance and regulation of cemeteries.

15

the ambit of the statute would reasonably include disinterments
that occurred outside established cemeteries as well.7
The final change in the statute occurred in 1987 as a result
of a highly-publicized murder case involving abuse of a corpse,
which prompted a state senator to seek a more expansive statute

with increased penalties. Outraged Senator Proposes Felony
Penalty for Abuse of Dead. Salt Lake Trib., Nov. 17# 1987 at Bl.
Now, in its entirety, the statute governing abuse or desecration
of a dead human body goes well beyond the original, limited
purposes of the 1898 law.
or addendum A.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1995)

Notably, however, the informations in this case

charged that defendants Mid disinter a buried or otherwise
interred dead body, without authority of a court order," language
taken verbatim from section 76-9-704(1) (b), the direct descendant
of the 1898 grave-robbing statutes.8
The basic, unchanged policy underlying section 76-9-704,

7

The 1973 recodification also changed the phrase Mead
body" to ^corpse." Subsequently, the word was changed again,
this time to Mead human body." Absent any authority to the
contrary, all three terms are treated synonymously here.
8

Notably, the annotations to all three versions of the
statute, including the most recent, reference an American Law
Reports article on the construction and application of grave
robbing statutes.
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dating back to 1898, is to discourage anyone from knowingly
disturbing an interred dead human being absent a lawful purpose,
regardless of the condition of the remains.

The guiding

principles are that all humans owe respect to those members of
our species who have gone before us, regardless of when they died
or in what condition their remains happen to be, and that
desecration of dead humans constitutes criminal conduct.
Consequently, any person who knowingly and unlawfully disinters
the dead would be culpable under section 76-9-704.
This statutory interpretation is consistent with decisions
from other jurisdictions that also construe Mead human body" in
light of statutory purposes.

£££, e.g.> State v. Duncan, 369

S.E.2d 464, 466-67 (W. Va. 1988) (concluding that statute which
prohibited "unlawful disinterment of dead human bodies" did not
require body first be decently or lawfully buried in light of
statute's express language and legislature's desire not to
distinguish between the types of graves which might be subject to
unlawful disinterment); Davis v. State. 6 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ga.
App. 1939) (construing law against removal of Mead bodies" to
include removal of "any part thereof/1 where defendant removed
skull with gold teeth from skeleton and purpose of law was to
prevent grave robbing); People v. Baumaartner. 66 P. 974, 975
17

(Cal. 1901) (interpreting phrase "to disinter a buried human
body" to mean exposing the body and removing it from the ground,
given the aim of the state body-snatching statute); Meads v.
Dougherty County. 25 S.E. 915, 915 (Ga. 1896) (holding a few
bleached bones washed on shore did not constitute a Mead body"
for purposes of a statute requiring an inquest when a dead body
indicates death by violence or under suspicious circumstances);

but see Carter v. Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126, 127 (Ohio 1898)
(holding terms "body" and "corpse," as used in statute penalizing
persons having unlawful possession of a dead body, do not include
remains of persons long buried and decomposed given object of the
statute was to secure interment and respect for human remains).
2. Section 76-9-704 should be read to be internally
consistent and to be in harmony with other related statutes.
*[A] fundamental rule of statutory construction requires
that a statute %be looked at in its entirety and in accordance
with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished.'"

State v.

Scieszka. 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)).

A

reviewing court, therefore, must ensure that the preliminary
hearing court's interpretation of section 76-9-704 is both
internally consistent and in harmony with related statutes, gee
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State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 468 (Utah 1988), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).
Section 76-9-704 delineates the four categories of conduct
that constitute abuse or desecration of a dead human body, and
then articulates certain acts that do not fall within its ambit
(2) A person does not commit an
this section if when he directs
out procedures regarding a dead
he is acting lawfully under any
following provisions:

offense under
or carries
human body,
of the

Funeral Services License Act;
(a)
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act;
(b)
Utah Medical Examiner Act;
(c)
Utah Medical Practices Act. . .;
(d)
Use of Dead Bodies for Medical Purposes;
(e)
or
(f) . . . Antiquities
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(2) (addendum A) .9 Of relevance to this
case is subsection (2)(f), referring to the Antiquities Act, is
of particular relevance to this case.

See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-

301 to -308 (1996).

5

This section's reference to one who %%directs or carries
out procedures'' may be read to indicate that the statute only
exempts conduct and persons that are otherwise regulated by other
statutes. That is, persons such as medical doctors, funeral
directors, anthropologists or archaeologists all have medical or
scientific purposes underlying their conduct. They are not
disinterring the dead for personal amusement or pecuniary gain.
Logically, any other persons and all other conduct not covered by
the exceptions would necessarily fall within the ambit of section
76-9-704.
19

To evaluate the correctness of the court's interpretation of
section 76-9-704(1), this court first assesses whether the
interpretation is consistent with other parts of the same
statute.

"In cases of apparent conflict between provisions of

the same statute, it is this Court's duty to harmonize and
reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court cannot presume
that the legislature intended to create a conflict."

Madsen v.

Brown. 701 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Utah 1985).
Here, the preliminary hearing court determined that "some
time after a person is buried and one thousand years later, a
'dead body' becomes 'remains'" (R. 49 or addendum B).

This

ruling implies that Mead bodies" and "remains" are mutually
exclusive categories.

That is, an individual dies and for an

uncertain amount of time, the corpse is a "dead body," protected
from abuse or desecration under section 76-9-704.

Somewhere

along the line, however, whether through the passage of time or
the forces of nature, the "dead body" becomes something lesser,
which the court labeled "remains" and which do not come within
the statute's protection.

If this is, indeed, the correct

interpretation of section 76-9-704, then the exceptions to the
statute must also address "dead human bodies," rather than the
separate category of "remains."
20

A close look at the Antiquities Act, the exception
applicable to this case, reveals relevant references only to the
term "specimen," rather than to either Mead human body" or
"remains."

The Antiquities Act, however, defines "specimen" as

"all man-made artifacts and remains of an archaeological or
anthropological nature found on or below the surface of the
earth, excluding structural remains."
302(13) (1996).

Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-

The Antiquities Act, then, addresses

archaeological or anthropological remains, not "dead human
bod? ^s."
If the preliminary hearing court had been correct in
differentiating "remains" from "dead human body" and in
concluding that the term "dead human body" does not include
"remains," then there would be no reason to list the Antiquities
Act as an exception to section 76-4-709 because the Antiquities
Act, by its own express terms, applies to "remains" and, hence -according to the preliminary hearing court, at least -- would not
apply to "dead human bodies."
Because the preliminary hearing court's reading of section
76-9-704 renders the statute's Antiquities Act exception mere
surplusage, another more reasonable interpretation must be
sought.

State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311, 313-14 (Utah 1995)
21

(rejecting an interpretation of a statute that obviates the
distinction between two terms, rendering one surplusage); Downey
State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp.. 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah
1978)(statutes should be read so as to avoid making any one of
their provisions "surplusage and meaningless"); Ferro v. Utah
Dep't of Commerce. 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah App. 1992)
(rejecting an interpretation of an act which would render one of
its provisions a nullity).

Examination of a related statute, the

Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA"),
provides the guidance necessary to resolve the conflict inherent
in the preliminary hearing court's approach.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 9-9-401 to -406 (1996) .
NAGPRA, which governs the ownership and disposition of
Native American remains and criminalizes illegal trafficking in
such remains, defines the term "remains" as "all or part of a
physical individual and objects on or attached to the physical
individual that are placed there as part of the death rite or
ceremony of a culture."

Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-402(7) (1996).

The

definition of "remains" articulated in NAGPRA is consistent with
the purposes of the Act --to protect Native American graves and
ensure that any Native American remains unearthed on state lands
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will be returned to their rightful owners.10

For purposes of

NAGPRA, then, no legal distinction is drawn between a dead human
body or any part of a dead human body.11

The same grave

protection policy applies to desecration of the dead, regardless
of the passage of time, the condition of the remains, or the race
of the dead.
Adopting NAGPRA's approach of treating all human remains
equally and of declining to engage in the impossible line-drawing
advocated by the preliminary hearing court in differentiating
Mead human body" from ^remains" makes good sense, especially in
light of the common purposes shared by NAGPRA and section 76-9-

10

Traditional beliefs and practices teach that Native
Americans "'have an inherent responsibility to care for those who
are no longer alive. When a body goes into the ground, it is
meant to stay there until the end of time. When remains are
disturbed and remain above the ground, their spirits are at
unrest. . . . These beliefs teach [Native Americans] to treat
those who they share this life with and those who have left them
to become a part of the Earth with the utmost respect.'"
Bonnichsen v. United States. 1997 WL 366799 at 1 (D. Or.

1997)(quoting Joint Tribal Amici Memorandum at 4-5).
11

The only Utah statutory definition of *part" is
contained in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which defines the
term as "an organ, tissue, eye, Jbone, blood vessel, blood, fluid,
or other portion of a human body." Utah Code Ann. § 26-282(7)(Supp. 1997)(emphasis added). Recent amendments to Title 26,
the Health Code, ^standardized various references to human
remains as "dead body or" dead fetus.1' See, e.g. . id. at § 26-216, Amendment Notes (Supp. 1997).
23

704.12

While NAGPRA is specifically aimed at protecting Native

American gravesites and section 76-9-704 has its origins in
protecting against grave-robbing, both share a common foundation
in the belief that the dead deserve to lie undisturbed.
Similarly, both share common histories of financial exploitation
resulting from disinterment of the dead.13

Applying NAGPRA's

policy-based approach to section 76-9-704 renders that statute
internally consistent and in harmony with both the Antiquities
Act and NAGPRA.

For purposes of all three laws, the kinds of

remains that are unearthed merit no legal distinctions.
3. The preliminary hearing court's interpretation of Mead
human body," as applied, is so unworkable and so racist in
its impact as to render that interpretation contrary to
public policy.
"Relevant policy considerations" also help guide statutory

12

Such an approach also creates a bright-line rule, which
courts can easily and even-handedly apply.
13

Grave-robbing, an evil well documented in the English
common law, was not unusual in the earlier days of this country.
£££, e-g-- PaVlS V. State/ 6 S.E. 2d 736 (Ga. App. 1939)

(defendant removed skull to harvest gold teeth). Nonetheless, in
a recent case, one federal court noted that it *is not aware of
any significant market in cultural objects and remains stolen
from predominantly Caucasian graveyards in the United States, or
of museums exhibiting and cataloguing thousands of Caucasian
skeletons, or of any parallel to the 'pot-hunters' who vandalize
and desecrate Indian graves."
Bonnichsen v. United States. 1997
WL 366799, at *19 (D.Or. 1997)(citation omitted).
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interpretation.

World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp.,

879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994).

In dismissing the felony charges

against defendants, the preliminary hearing court determined that
the statute was inapplicable because "in the eyes of the
legislature, some time after a person is buried and one thousand
years later, a *dead body' becomes ^remains'" (R. 49). In its
oral ruling, the court opined that the statute was intended "to
keep the people from digging around in graveyards" (R. Ill).
From a practical standpoint, then, the preliminary hearing court
limited the statute's applicability to established cemeteries.
Such an interpretation offends public policy.

The

preliminary hearing court's interpretation of "dead human body"
suggests that either the decomposition of the corporeal being or
simply the passage of time change a "dead human being" into
"remains" and, thus, at whatever point this occurs, section 76-9704(1) becomes inapplicable.
If passage of time was the test for determining whether
human remains constituted a "dead human body" for purposes of
section 76-9-704, disinterring the recently dead would be a
felony, while disinterring those dead for some unspecified longer
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period of time would not.14

Thus, those buried "recently" in

Utah -- for example, pioneers buried in established Anglo
cemeteries -- would be protected, and the law would punish
violators as a felony.

In contrast, those buried "long ago" --

for example, the ancient peoples who lived here centuries ago and
were buried in ways customary to their culture but foreign to
modern peoples -- would not be so protected.

The obvious racism

inherent in such an interpretation renders it contrary to both
common sense and public policy.

There is no reason to surmise

that the legislature intended such a result.
Similarly, if the degree of decomposition were the test for
whether human remains constituted a "dead human body" for
purposes of section 76-9-704, a perpetrator's culpability would
be dependent upon what was discovered in the burial site, rather
than on the criminal act of disinterring.

That is, if one dug

into a burial site and found a relatively intact body, one could

14

Other lesser penalties, for acts related to but not as
serious as the actual disinterment, are available pursuant to
other statutes. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann § 9-8-302 et seq. (The
Antiquities Act, which punishes the act of excavating on state
lands without a permit as a class B misdemeanor); Utah Code Ann.
§ 9-4-401 et seq. (Native American Grave Protection and
Repatriation Act, which punishes illegal trafficking in remains
as a class A misdemeanor or, subsequently, as a third degree
felony).
26

be convicted of abuse or desecration of a dead human body,
regardless of the passage of time since death.

If, however,

conditions were such that the body had decomposed or the skeleton
had been ravaged, one could not be so charged.

This approach,

however, runs afoul of a fundamental societal value -- respect
for the dead and the sanctity of leaving human remains
undisturbed.

Logically, the criminal act should turn on the act

of disinterring, not on what happens to be found once the
disinterment is complete.
The preliminary hearing court's interpretation of section
76-9-704 is also premised on a faulty policy assumption.

In

orally articulating its ruling, the court stated: Ml]f these had
been on Mr. Guymon's property they would have been --it would
not [have] been permissible to disturb them, and I'xr thinking of
all the farmers that have run their plows across lands and
disturbed human remains" (R. 110 or addendum C).
The court, however, ignored a critical element of the
statute -- that the desecration, whether on public or private
land, must be intentional in order to be a felony.15

15

See Utah

It must also be ^unlawful." Hence, if the excavation
was done pursuant to a permit issued under the Antiquities Act,
the digger would be insulated from liability. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 9-8-305 (2) (a); £££ also Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-403 (3) (a) .
27

Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1).

Plainly, an unintentional unearthing of

human remains would not be punishable as a felony.

All the law

seeks to do under those circumstances is to require reporting.
fi££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(3); § 9-9-403 (4) (a) . Thus, the
court's concern that a farmer who unintentionally unearths a
human remain will become a felon is without foundation in the
law.
Finally, the preliminary hearing court's interpretation
would leave a hole in the law that policy dictates should be
filled.

The Antiquities Act punishes surveying or excavating on

state lands without a permit, violations of which are a class B
misdemeanor.

See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-305.

NAGPRA punishes

illegal trafficking in Native American remains, making such
conduct initially a class A misdemeanor and, subsequently, a
third degree felony.

See Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-404.

Section 76-

9-704 punishes unlawful and intentional disinterment as a third
degree felony.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(3).

Defendants

here acted without a permit, but did not traffic in remains.
However, the gravamen of their crime was not merely acting

(requiring permit issued under Antiquities Act in order to
intentionally remove or excavate Native American remains from
state land).
28

without a permit; it was their intentional and unlawful
disinterring of the dead.

Unless section 76-9-704 is read to

include their intentional and unlawful conduct, the heinous part
of their behavior will not be punishable under the law,
4. When properly interpreted, section 76-9-704 mandates
that defendants be bound over for intentionally and
unlawfully disinterring Anasazi remains.
In this case, there was ample evidence of defendants'
intentional and unlawful act of disinterring the dead,

gee

State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991)(intent, usually not
susceptible to proof by direct evidence, may be proven by
circumstantial evidence).
in a variety of ways.

Here, defendants' intent was evidenced

First, their vehicle, which was parked

near the dig site, bore vanity license plates emblazoned with the
single word, "ANASAZI" (R. 71). A fair implication from the
license plate is that the owners had a significant interest in
and knowledge of the Anasazi culture.

Second, defendants'

children, standing nearby, openly acknowledged that their parents
were digging (Id.).

The fair inference from this fact is that

the parents, who were out of sight at the dig location, told the
children they were going to dig.

Third, the children described

the event as a "family outing" (Id.).

A fair inference from this

statement is that the activities were not uncommon for the
29

family, but more on the line of a weekend picnic.

Fourth, the

site at which defendants were digging was a known Anasazi site,
complete with a recognizable midden area (R. 100). A fair
inference from this fact is that defendants knew where they were
digging and, indeed, chose to dig there precisely because it was
an Anasazi burial site, where items of value could be expected to
be found near the deceased.16

Fifth, when apprehended at the

scene, defendants asserted that their acts occurred on private
land (R. 71). A fair inference from this fact is that defendants
knew that if the archaeological site at which they had been
caught digging was located on public land, they would be
criminally culpable for trespass on trust lands,
Ann. § 53C-2-30K1) (f) (Supp. 1994).

gee Utah Code

Finally, there was no

evidence that defendants had secured permits that would render
their actions lawful.

See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-305(2) (a); § 9-9-

403(3) (a) (1996) .
The preliminary hearing court found probable cause to

16

The court may take judicial notice of the pecuniary
value of Anasazi remains, both corporeal and material. See.

e.g./ United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1417, 1420 (10th
Cir. 1997)(noting that defendant, convicted under federal law for
looting an Anasazi site in San Juan County, Utah, had discussed
*his experience in finding archeological artifacts and his
experience in making large amounts of money selling those
[Anasazi] artifacts").
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believe that defendants disturbed or disinterred human remains
and failed to bind over only because it misinterpreted the
applicable statute.

However, where the evidence showed that

defendants were intentionally and unlawfully digging in a known
Anasazi burial site, and where there is no dispute that they
disinterred human remains, their conduct properly fell within the
ambit of section 76-9-704, as that law is interpreted in light of
legislative history, statutory consistency, and public policy.
When section 76-9-704 is correctly interpreted and applied to the
facts of this case, the preliminary hearing court's finding of
probable cause supports an order binding defendants over to
district court to stand trial on the felony charges.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court &.. /uld vacate the order
of dismissal issued by the preliminary hearing court, reinstate
the felony information, and order that defendants be bound over
to district court to stand trial for abuse or desecration of a
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dead human body, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-704.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 25. d a Y

of

August, 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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137, Moab, Utah 84532 and Rod W. Snow, Dixon & Snow, 425 South
Cherry St., #1000, Denver, Colorado 80222, this ^ S day of
August, 1997.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-9-704. Abuse or desecration of a dead human body —
Penalties.
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of a dead human body if the
person intentionally and unlawfully:
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the finding of a dead body to a local
law enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it;
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred dead body, without authority of a court order;
(c) dismembers a dead body to any extent, or damages or detaches any
part or portion of a dead body; or
(d) commits, or attempts to commit upon any dead body sexual penetration or intercourse, object rape, sodomy, or object sodomy, as these acts
are described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Person.
(2) A person does not commit an offense under this section if when he directs
or carries out procedures regarding a dead human body, he is acting lawfully
under any of the following provisions:
(a) Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Service License Act;
(b) Title 26, Chapter 28, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act;
(c) Title 26, Chapter 4, Utah Medical Examiner Act;
(d) Title 58, Chapter 12, Part 5, Utah Medical Practice Act, which
concerns licensing to practice medico;
(e) Title 53B, Chapter 17, Part c, Use of Dead Bodies for Medical
Purposes; or
(f) Title 9, Chapter 8, Pail 3, Antiquities.
(3) Abuse or desecration of a dead human body is a third degree felony
except failing to report a finding of a human body is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-9-704, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-9-704; 1988, ch. 53, § 1;
1991, ch. 241, 5 102; 1992, ch. 241, § 375.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"class B" for "class A" in Subsection (3) and

made corrections and changes in the style of the
chapter references in Subsections (IXd) and (2).
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13,
1992, substituted the reference to Title 9, Chapter 8, Part 3 for a reference to §§ 63-18-18
through 63-18-31 in Subsection (2Xf).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 22AAm. Jur. 2d Deac5 Bodies
§ 109.
CJS. — 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 10.
A X J t — Construction and application of

grave-robbing statutes, 52 A.L.R.3d 701.
Liability for desecration of graves and tombstones, 77 A.L.R.4th 108.
Key Numbers. — Dead Bodies *» 7.

Addendum B

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

«•> APR - 1 1997
CLERK OF THE COURT
BY

— DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS £ ORDER

vs.
JAMES REDD and JEANNE REDD,
Defendants.

Case Nos. 9617-229 and
9617-230
j

The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and
considered the brief submitted by counsel for Dr. and Mrs. Redd,
makes the following findings and order, based upon the evidence
presented today.
1.

Probable cause is found as to the trespass count.

2.

The state presented evidence that defendants, in the

process of searching for archeological artifacts, disturbed human
bones and bone fragments.

The state has not shown that the bones

were in their original place of repose before they were disturbed
by defendants.
3.

The legislature has addressed the excavation of artifacts

and human remains in Title 9, Chapter 8 and 9, Utah Code (1996),
and carefully avoided regulating, without the owner's consent, the
excavation of artifacts and human remains on private property.

FINDINGS AND ORDER
STATE VS REDD AND REDD
CASE NO 9617-229 &230
PAGE 2

4.

The section under which defendants are charged with

desecration of a corpse does not define "burial11, "interment" or
"dead body".
5.
of

an

Title 9, Chapter 9, Utah Code (1996) refers to portions
individual that

are

found

in archaeological

sites as

"remains".
6.

Reading Section 76-9-704 and Title 9, Chapters 8 & 9

together, the court concludes that in the eyes of the legislature,
some time after a person is buried and one thousand years later, a
"dead body" becomes "remains".
7.

The statues clearly evidence a legislative intent to

avoid regulation of private excavation of archaeological sites on
private land unless the owner has consented to regulation.
8.

The interpretation argued by the state in this case would

extend Section 76-9-704 to all private lands in Utah, contrary to
legislative intent, and make it a felony for private persons to
disturb one thousand year old remains on their own lands.
9.

With the consent of defendants, the misdemeanor trespass

is held in abeyance for six months, for a status hearing as to the
felony, which this Court refuses to bind over for trial for the
reasons herein stated.

FINDINGS AND ORDER
STATE VS REDD AND REDD
CASE NO 9617-229 &230
PAGE 3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge of desecration of a
corpse against each defendant is dismissed.
DATED this 151

^flay of April, 1997.

Lyle/RT Anderson,
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the
foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER, postage prepaid, to the following:
William Benge
Deputy County Attorney
125 East Center
Moab, UT 84532

William L. Schultz
Attorney at Law
PO Box 137
Moab, UT 84532

Rod W. Snow
Dixon & Snow, P.C.
425 S. Cherry Street., #1000
Denver, CO 80222
DATE this

X&

day of April, 1997.

Deputy Court Clerk
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Addendum C

STATE RESTS

1
2

THE COURT: Any evidence from the defense?

3

MR. SNOW: No, thank you.

4

THE COURT: All right, do you wish to present

5

argument? I have reviewed your Memorandum.
MR. SNOW: Judge, I would simply incorporate the

6
7

Memorandum at this point in interest of time, I know you have a

8

heavy docket.
THE COURT: Mr. Benge?

9

MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I'll submit it, I — I haven't

10
11

had a chance to read the Memorandum, it was just handed to me

12

before court, so I really not gonna comment on this time, I'll submit

13

it.

14

THE COURT: From the evidence that's been presented

15

here, I find that there is probable cause to believe that the

16

defendant's did trespass on state trust lands, I also find probable

17

cause to believe that they — that they did disturb these — or even

IS

disinterred these remains. Whether that constitutes a criminal

19

offense of desecration of a corpse, or abuse or desecration of a dead

20

human body is what's addressed in the defendant's Memorandum and

21

these are remains that presumably are a thousand years old. I guess

22

there's one school of thought that It doesn't matter how old the

23

remains are, they're still human remains, and they need to be

24

protected from being disturbed. Under that theory, if these had been

25

on Mr. Guymon's property they would have been — it would not been

M. Jane Musselman
Certified Court Transcriber
P.O. Box 531
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-2351
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1

a permissible to disturb them, and I'm thinking of ail the farmers that

2

have run their plows across lands and — and disturbed human

3

remains. The other — the other — and — and these are human

4

remains that are entitled to respect, these — these people probably

5

have descendants living today who care that they be treated with

6

respect. The descendant's of these people probably are the Pueblo

7

Indians, if — if any descendants exist.

8

The other school of thought is, "Hey wait a minute, you know,

9

there's a rule of reason that has to apply here, we're talking about

10

disturbing human remains that have been buried in a place that's

11

been set aside for the preserving of human remains, the cemetery

12

and — and there has to be a certain point when we can't— we can't

13

hold people guilty for a — of a Third Degree Felony because they —

14

they don't avoid all of these human remains and — and these remain

15

are scattered all over this part of the country. I presume all over the

16

world this situation exists.

17

And I don't know — really I don't know the answer to the

18

question. There's these two philosophies, both of them entitled to

19

legitimate treatment. Both — both of them legitimate and entitled to

20

respect. But, I have to decide as a magistrate, whether I will bind

21

over and hold the — the Redd's for trial on these charges. If I hold

22

them over for trial, they'll go to — they'll go to trial, they'll endure th

23

expense and the trauma of a — of a trial on a felony charge. Citizen,

24

of this county will be summoned in to try the case, and the state will

25

be put to considerable expense to try the case. And, It may go up on
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appeal and the Supreme Court will tell us, "Wait a minute." Or the

2

Court of Appeals will say, "Wait a minute, we didn't — we didn't thini

3

this - we don't think this statute intended to extend this far."

4

And this is a statute that as you read the statute in it's entirety,

5

think clearly in — clearly evidences a legislative intent to keep the

6

people from digging around in graveyards. You gotta report the bod^.

7

you can't disinter it or, you can't dismember it or damage it. You

8

can't commit any of these unspeakable acts on a dead body. The

9

Supreme Court may say, "Well, you know, we weren't talking — the

10
11

statute wasn't talking about this kind of a situation."
And if I — if I dismiss the charges, fail to bind over, then the

12

state could take an appeal, the Supreme Court can tell us what the

13

law is on this case, and we'll — we won't be disturbing the citizens of

14

the county, we won't be putting Dr. and Mrs. Redd to the trauma of i

15

trial without knowing that that's what the law is, by an authoritative

16

source. And what I think about this isn't gonna matter when the

17

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court reviews this. It's gonna be —

18

they will give my decision no deference whatsoever.

19

And so I am going to — I am not going to bind over on the felon

20

charges, I will dismiss those charges and while indicating as I have,

21

my factual findings are that they did disinter these remains. And if

22

that amounts to this offense, then this case should be sent back for

23

trial, and I should be ordered — reversed and ordered to bind the

24

defendant's over. Now that puts us in a kind of a strange procedural

25

position on the second counts of the Informations, and what I'm goin.
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1

to suggest is that we stay any further proceedings on those until the

2

state has an opportunity to take an appeal and we get a decision on

3

that, either the state — well, until we get a decision on that.
Is that agreeable with your clients, Mr. Snow?

4

MR. SNOW: Very much so, Judge and I appreciate the|

5
6

court's analysis.

7

THE COURT: All right.

8

MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor that would be

9

fine.
THE COURT: Mr. Snow, it will be up to you and Mr.

10
11

Schultz to prepare an Order putting into — putting on paper the

12

court's decision here.
MR. SCHULTZ: Any other findings, Judge you said

13
14

that your findings is that they did disinter?

15

THE COURT: Yes.

16

MR. SCHULTZ: Anything else you want in the Order?

17

I — I made notes.
THE COURT: All right, does anyone need Exhibit One

18
19

and Two back?

20

MR. BENGE: I would like them returned, Your Honor.

21

MR. SCHULTZ: No objection to that, Judge.

22

THE COURT: Exhibit's One and Two returned to Mr.

23

Benge. Just to make sure we don't lose track of this case, let's set a

24

date six months from now when the defendant's will be back here, or

25

at least will have a report, and set a future date — so we haven't yet
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